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NOTES
WARRANTLESS AERIAL OBSERVATION
OF A BACKYARD
In California v. CiraoloI the United States Supreme Court held
that warrantless aerial observation from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a
fenced-in home backyard does not violate the fourth amendment.2
The Supreme Court's decision in Ciraolo misapplied the prevailing
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test and thereby failed to deter-
mine whether the police conducted a proper fourth amendment
search by'considering the dweller's expectations. Moreover, by fail-
ing to consider the nature of the place surveyed, the Court left the
curtilage, a traditionally protected area, unprotected from aerial po-
lice surveillance. The Court's holding allows police to fly over a
home without a warrant, even when the yard is not observable at
ground level, to search for contraband that police officials believe
might be located in the yard.
This Note reviews the history of search cases and the applica-
tion of the fourth amendment to warrantless aerial surveillance of
the curtilage. The Note then critiques the Ciraolo majority's 3 analy-
sis, which not only mischaracterizes the search in question as "sim-
ple visual observations from a public place," 4 but also departs from
prior fourth amendment decisions. Finally, the Note considers the
policy implications of the Court's decision.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Definition of a Fourth Amendment Search
The fourth amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unrea-
l 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
2 Id. at 1811-13. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 Chief Justice Burger wrote the Court's opinion and was joined by Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, White, and Stevens.
4 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
sonable searches and seizures." 5 Fourth amendment cases involve a
two-step test: First, determinaion of whether a fourth amendment
search occurred; and second, if so, was the search reasonable. If a
fourth amendment search occurs, and if it is not reasonable, then
the search violates the fourth amendment.
1. Katz v. United States
Prior to Katz v. United States,6 a search in violation of the fourth
amendment was limited to a physical intrusion into a "constitution-
ally protected area." 7 The Court deemed certain areas, such as
houses and their "curtilage," 8 "constitutionally protected areas." 9
Unreasonable searches of "constitutionally protected areas" con-
sisted of "any physical entry by law enforcement officers [or] any
physical intrusion of a surveillance device into the premises."' 0
In Katz v. United States I I the Court revised this traditional notion
of fourth amendment searches. t 2 The Court stressed the defend-
ant's intent rather than "protected areas" in defining the relevant
privacy interests 13 and established that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places."' 4 Justice Stewart's majority opinion
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The basic purpose of the amendment "is to safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental offi-
cials." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1966).
6 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7 1 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.1, at 223 (1979); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (warrantless
wiretap did not violate fourth amendment because no actual physical invasion of prop-
erty occurred); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (warrantless use ofdetec-
taphone by Government agents did not violate fourth amendment because no trespass
took place).
8 Curtilage is defined as "[t]he inclosed space of ground and buildings immedi-
ately surrounding a dwelinghouse.... For search and seizure purposes [the definition]
includes those outbuildings which are directly and intimately connected with the habita-
tion and in proximity thereto and the land or grounds surrounding the dwelling which
are necessary and convenient and habitually used for family purposes and carrying on
domestic employment." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 346 (5th ed. 1979).
9 1 W. LA FAVE, supra note 7, at 223.
10 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356
(1974); see alsoJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (court found search of hotel
room unreasonable when officers entered without warrant after detecting smell of burn-
ing opium outside room.); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (eavesdrop-
ping by pushing listening devices through adjoining walls violated fourth amendment).
11 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12 Id. at 353. The defendant in Katz was convicted based on evidence obtained by
the F.B.I. from warrantless eavesdropping. The F.B.I. attached microphones to a public
telephone booth where Katz made his phone calls. Id.; see generally Note, Telescopes, Binoc-
ulars, and the Fourth Amendment, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 379, 382 (1982) (authored by
Lawrence Marks).
13 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
14 Id. at 351.
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never defined when the fourth amendment protects people;' 5 Jus-
tice Harlan's concurrence, however, posited a two-part test' 6 to as-
certain whether a fourth amendment search has occurred.' 7 The
test, later termed the "reasonable expectation of privacy test,"18
poses two questions: (1) whether the individual, by his conduct, has
exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and
(2) whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.' 9
Justice Harlan's test defines the scope of fourth amendment
protection by focusing on privacy rights rather than property rights.
The fourth amendment protects those things that a person "seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public," 20 un-
less the person's expectation of privacy is unreasonable under the
circumstances. Areas traditionally protected remain protected
under the Harlan test only if an individual exhibits an intention to
keep the area private. For example, "a man's home is, for most pur-
poses, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or
statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not
'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited." 2'
2. The Continued Importance After Katz of the Curtilage as a
"Constitutionally Protected Area"
Recent Supreme Court decisions, although purporting to apply
the Katz test,22 have continued to stress the importance of the tradi-
tional "constitutionally protected areas." 23  In Oliver v. United
States24 the Court singled out the curtilage 25 as a place where an
15 See Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amend-
ment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968, 976 (1968).
16 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In cases decided after Katz, the
Supreme Court has applied Justice Harlan's "reasonable expectation of privacy test."
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979).
17 The test has been termed a "standard to determine whether an individual has
'justifiably relied' on privacy." Note, supra note 15, at 982.
18 Id.
19 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20 Id. at 351.
21 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
22 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) ("individual may not legiti-
mately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in area
immediately surrounding the home"). The Katz decision, by its own language, is ambig-
uous regarding traditional constitutionally protected areas such as the home.
23 1 W. LA FAVE, supra note 7, at 223; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589
(1980) ("The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of set-
tings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home-a zone that finds its roots in
clear and specific constitutional terms."); supra note 7 and accompanying text.
24 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
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individual may "legitimately demand privacy for activities con-
ducted out of doors." 26 The Oliver Court noted that the curtilage
has traditionally "been considered part of the home itself for Fourth
Amendment purposes." 27 Nevertheless, the Oliver Court did not de-
fine the limits of the fourth amendment protection afforded the cur-
tilage;28 the Court left unclear the extent to which the Katz test and
the earlier place-defined doctrines can coexist.2 9 Furthermore, the
Court did not establish the weight to be accorded an individual's
privacy interests in his curtilage. This lack of clarity is illustrated in
cases of warrantless aerial surveillance of the curtilage.
B. Warrantless Aerial Surveillance of the Curtilage
Aerial surveillance has become an increasingly important tool
in law enforcement. 30 In recent years, individuals subjected to war-
rantless aerial surveillance have repeatedly challenged such action
as a fourth amendment search. 31 Courts, employing the Katz and
Oliver standards, have had difficulty determining whether a particu-
lar aerial surveillance is a fourth amendment search. 32 Warrantless
aerial surveillance of the curtilage is an exemplary problem for de-
velopment of fourth amendment analysis because it requires that
courts come to terms with the coexistence of place-defined and per-
son-defined rights of privacy.
1. The Facts-of-Surveillance Approach
Some courts, applying Katz, have found that a dweller's expec-
tation of privacy in his curtilage is unreasonable where officials sur-
25 See supra note 8.
26 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 (in contrast to curtilage, individual may not legitimately
demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields). See also United States v.
Williams, 581 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979) ("[T]he
distinction between open fields and curtilage is still helpful in determining the existence
or not of reasonable privacy expectations.").
27 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
28 Id. at 180 n.11.
29 See Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 358, 443-44 & n.83.
30 See generally Note, Aerial Surveillance: Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, 50 FORDHAM
L. REV. 271 (1981) (authored by Susan Higgins); Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of
Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725 (1985) (authored by
Eric Bender) [hereinafter Note, Curtains for the Curtilage?]; Recent Development, Warrant-
less Aerial Surveillance: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 409 (1982) (authored by
Kurt Schmalz).
31 See infra note 33; see also Comment, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: Searchingfor Con-
stitutional Standards, 52 J. AIR L. & CoM. 257, 275 (1986) (authored by Mark Smith).
32 Courts and commentators have noted that the allowance of warrantless over-
flights "poses difficult questions of fourth amendment law." United States v. Alexander,
761 F.2d 1294, 1299 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Comment, supra note 31, at 259; Note,
Curtains for the Curtilage?, supra note 30, at 726.
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vey the area in a "reasonable and lawful manner." 33 These courts
hold that no search occurs if the surveillance results in an "observa-
tion that could be expected by a reasonably curious passerby on the
'highway' of the sky." 34 For example, in United States v. Bassford,35
the court found that surveillance of an area where marijuana plants
were growing did not amount to a search.36 According to the court,
no fourth amendment search occurred because a reasonably curious
member of the public who was flying over the area would have no-
ticed the striking difference between the color of the marijuana
plants and the other flora in the area.3 7
In applying the "reasonably curious" standard, courts have
considered the following factors: whether the surveillance was de-
liberate, sustained, or disruptive;38 whether the police conducted
overflight at a lower altitude than usual flight patterns over the
area;3 9 whether there were frequent flights over the area;40 and the
nature of the place surveyed. 41
2. The Protected Curtilage Approach
Other courts, applying the analytical framework of Katz, have
found a subjective expectation of privacy reasonable if a dweller ex-
33 See NORML v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985), remanded, 796 F.2d 276
(9th Cir. 1986) (finding warrantless aerial surveillance of curtilage unreasonable when
surveillance deliberate, sustained and disruptive; remanded for reconsideration in light
of Ciraolo). Compare People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973)
(finding warrantless aerial surveillance of backyard unreasonable because helicopter ob-
serving backyard flew at altitude of 20-25 feet and was noisy) with United States v.
DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (finding warrantless aerial surveillance
of farm reasonable because low altitude airplane flights frequently occurred in area) and
State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 419, 570 P.2d 1323, 1327-28 (1977) (finding warrantless
aerial surveillance of property reasonable because tour, pleasure and business aircraft
flew over daily and surveillance helicopter flew over at reasonable and lawful height); see
also Note, Curtains for the Curtilage?, supra note 30, at 746-47.
34 Note, Curtains for the Curtilage?, supra note 30, at 747; see also cases cited supra note
33. Courts have also used the "curious passerby" approach in terrestrial searches, see
United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 947 (1972)
(police surveillance that uncovers what was protected by dweller from observations of
curious passerby is unreasonable).
35 601 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Me. 1985), aff'd, 812 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1909 (1987).
36 Id. at 1331.
37 Id.
38 See cases cited supra note 33.
39 DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. at 1081 (flights at low altitude not infrequent); People v.
Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 543, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146, 151 (1973) (reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy from helicopter flight at 20-25 feet.).
40 Bassford, 601 F. Supp. at 1330 (small plane flights common in area).
41 Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 118, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589
(1973) (no reasonable expectation of privacy over three-quarter-acre tract of cultivation
surrounded by forests).
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hibits an intention to keep his curtilage private.42 Thus, even if the
curtilage is open to the view of police overflights, these courts will
not find a fourth amendment search because the dweller has exhib-
ited an intention to keep his curtilage private. These courts empha-
size the first prong of the Katz test-did the dweller exhibit a
subjective expectation of privacy in his curtilage? If so, the aerial
surveillance is not a search because courts consider a privacy expec-
tation in the curtilage, a "constitutionally protected area," reason-
able. 43 These courts tend, therefore, to answer the second Katz
question by equating society's view of reasonableness with tradi-
tional, place-oriented, protected attitudes about the curtilage. Thus,
a dweller's subjective expectation of privacy in his curtilage is rea-
sonable because the curtilage is a traditionally protected area.
For these courts, the likelihood of overflight has no bearing on
the reasonableness of privacy expectations in the curtilage. These
courts consider warrantless overflights analogous to telescopes and
other devices that enhance police officers' views of the home and its
curtilage. 44 The fourth amendment prohibits warrantless use of
these technologies to view a home or curtilage. 45 Overflights, like
telescopes, create a view for police officers that would not exist with-
out the help of the technology.46 Therefore, any "open view" that
42 See People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("The routine
surveillance by police observers in aircraft of the areas adjacent to residences is an intol-
erable imposition upon our liberty and privacy."), retransferredfor reconsideration in light of
California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986), by 238 Cal. Rptr. 374, 738 P.2d 720 (1987);
People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 710 P.2d 299 (1985) (aerial surveil-
lance of backyard shielded from ground-level view violates California constitution); cf
People v. Stanislawski, 180 Cal. App. 3d 748, 755-56, 225 Cal. Rptr. 770, 774 (1986)
(aerial surveillance constitutional when it embraces both open field and protected
curtilage).
43 See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
44 See Cook, 41 Cal. 3d at 385, 710 P.2d at 307, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 507 (analogizing
aerial surveillance to use of electronic beeper in house); Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (ae-
rial observation "lift[s] states gaze" and reduces "the extent of one's privacy").
45 In fact, the Ciraolo majority recited the State's acknowledgment that "'[alerial
observation of a curtilage may become invasive... through modern technology which
discloses to the senses those intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise im-
perceptible to police or fellow citizens.' " Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1814 n.3 (quoting Brief
for Petitioner at 14-15, California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986) (No. 84-1513)). See
also, United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (monitoring of electronic beeper in
private residence unconstitutional); United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1980) (warrantless use of telescope to view apartment unconstitutional). But see United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (warrantless use of electronic tracking devices
on cars driving on public highways constitutional). See generally Note, Curtains for the Cur-
tilage?, supra note 30, at 748. Telescopic viewing of the home is unconstitutional even if
the homeowner fails to obstruct the view from the outside by not closing the curtains.
See, e.g., Taborda, 635 F.2d at 138-39 (inference of intended privacy not rebutted by fail-
ure to obstruct telescopic view by not closing curtains).
46 See, e.g., Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 835 ("If limitations of privacy can be technologi-
cally leaped, as by the use of aircraft to lift the state's gaze above a restrictive fence, the
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the police obtain by overflights is not "open view" but merely an
enhanced view obtained by the use of technology.
In sum, prior to Giraolo, courts tended to fall into one of two
groups. In the first group, if a dweller exhibited a subjective expec-
tation of privacy, then the court decided whether the expectation
was reasonable; that inquiry rested on whether the overflight was
analogous to the passing flight of a "reasonably curious pass-
erby." 4 7 In the second group, if a dweller exhibited a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy in his curtilage, then the court found his
expectation reasonable because the curtilage is an area that society
is willing to protect. These courts gave no weight to the view of the
"reasonably curious" air passenger in determining the reasonable-
ness of a dweller's expectation of privacy. Instead, they analogized
overflights to telescopes and other technological devices, and found
that the dweller does not need to exhibit a subjective expectation of
privacy from such "enhanced" views.48 Thus, a backyard, sur-
rounded by fences and unobservable from ground level is an area
that the second group of courts was willing to protect. The courts,
therefore, had pursued a well-developed, although not altogether
coherent, range of approaches to aerial surveillance cases when the
police surveyed Ciraolo's backyard from the air.
II
CALIFORNIA V. CIAoLo: No REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN ONE'S OWN BACKYARD
A. Facts
On September 2, 1982, the Santa Clara police received an
anonymous telephone tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his
backyard.49 The police could not observe the backyard from
ground level because the area was enclosed by a six-foot outer fence
and a ten-foot inner fence.5 0 Later that day, the police chartered a
plane to fly overhead, within public navigable airspace, to view
Ciraolo's backyard. 51 From the plane, the officers observed mari-
juana plants growing in Ciraolo's backyard. After obtaining a war-
rant,52 the officers seized the plants. 53
extent of one's privacy is no greater than the sophistication of equipment possessed by
the state.").
47 See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
48 See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
49 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1810.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1811. The police obtained a search warrant on the basis of (1) an affidavit
describing the anonymous tip and the officer's observations of the backyard; and (2) a
photograph showing Ciraolo's backyard as well as neighboring homes. Id.
53 Id..
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Ciraolo tried to suppress the evidence seized in the search.54
The trial court denied his motion to suppress and thereafter Ciraolo
pleaded guilty to cultivation of marijuana. 55 The California Court
of Appeal56 reversed, holding that the warrantless aerial observation
of Ciraolo's backyard was an unreasonable search in violation of the
fourth amendment.57 The Court of Appeal applied the Katz test,
finding that (1) Ciraolo exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy
by building the fences surrounding his yard 58 and (2) such an expec-
tation was "reasonable ... by any standard." 59 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether warrantless
aerial observation from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a home's fenced-
in backyard violated the fourth amendment.60
B. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, 6' reversed the
California Court of Appeal and found that Ciraolo's subjective ex-
pectation of privacy was not reasonable because the marijuana in his
backyard was visible from a "public vantage point." 62 The Court
reasoned that because the police observations took place in public
navigable airspace, 63 "[a]ny member of the public flying in this air-
space who glanced down could have seen everything that these of-
ficers observed." 64
The Court's analysis in Ciraolo appears to turn on the "open
view doctrine." Under the "open view" doctrine it is reasonable for
the government to view an area that a dweller knowingly leaves
open to public view.65 Because private and commercial airplanes
54 Id. Admission of evidence against a defendant obtained in contravention of the
fourth amendment is prohibited under the exclusionary rule, Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960), which applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
55 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811.
56 People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1984).
57 Id. at 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
58 Id. at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
59 Id. Factors the California Court of Appeal considered significant in determining
that society would deem Ciraolo's expectation of privacy reasonable included the fact
that the surveillance was over the curtilage and that the flyover was focused and deliber-
ate. Id. at 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98.
60 California v. Ciraolo, 471 U.S. 1134 (1985).
61 See supra note 3.
62 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812.
63 See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1304 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
64 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
65 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). For an example of a case involv-
ing nonaerial surveillance, see State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 711-13, 578 P.2d 969,
973-74 (1974) (no reasonable expectation of privacy where foreseeable that neighbor
could see into backyard surrounded only by low picket fence and some vegetation). But
see, People v. Fly, 34 Cal. App. 3d 665, 667, 110 Cal. Rptr. 158, 159-60 (1973) (reason-
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routinely fly in the public airways, Ciraolo's backyard was in "open
view" to those members of the public flying over his home.
Ciraolo's activities in his backyard were exposed to outsiders and,
therefore, his expectation of privacy was not reasonable. 66 Thus,
the police surveillance of his backyard was not an unreasonable
search. 67
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Powell's dissent 68 in Ciraolo criticizes the majority for
basing its decision solely on the fact that "the air space generally is
open to all persons for travel in airplanes."6 9 Powell felt that even if
Ciraolo's backyard was in the open view of the airplane-riding pub-
lic, that fact alone should not have determined whether Ciraolo's
expectation of privacy was reasonable. 70
Powell reasoned that courts should construe the fourth amend-
ment prohibition against unreasonable searches "in light of contem-
porary norms and conditions. ' 71 Thus, the determination of the
second question in Katz-whether society deems reasonable an indi-
vidual's subjective expectation of privacy-compels a court to ask
"whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal
and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment." 72 A court
should give weight to factors such as "the uses to which an individ-
ual has put a location" 73 and "our societal understanding that cer-
tain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government
invasion." 74 Society traditionally has considered the curtilage an
area where privacy interests have been afforded the "most height-
ened" protection.75 Therefore, the Court should have given more
able expectation of privacy where fence and vegetation made observation of backyard
extremely difficult). See also Note, Curtains for the Curtilage?, supra note 30, at 743 nn.1 11-
12.
66 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
67 In contrast, Ciraolo could reasonably expect to maintain his privacy from ground
level intrusions. Thus, if the police officers intruded into his backyard without a warrant
or climbed a ladder to look over the fence, such a search would be unreasonable and
thereby violate the fourth amendment. Id. at 1817 (Powell, J., dissenting).
68 Justice Powell dissented and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun.
69 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1815 (quoting Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981)
(quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980))).
72 Id. at 1816 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984)).
73 Id at 1816.
74 Id.; see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978) ("Legitimation of
expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment,
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society.").
75 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1817 (Powell,J., dissenting). The majority opinion in Ciraolo
105
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weight to Ciraolo's interest in maintaining a private backyard.
In addition, Powell criticized the majority's reasoning that
Ciraolo's expectation of privacy was unreasonable because the back-
yard was in open view.76 "[T]he actual risk to privacy from commer-
cial or pleasure aircraft is virtually nonexistent."' 77 Because most
citizens do not assume that there is a risk to their privacy from
above, the dissenting opinion concluded that Ciraolo did not
"knowingly expos[e]" his yard to the public. 78
Finally, Justice Powell found a "qualitative difference between
police surveillance and other uses made of the air space." 79 Be-
cause police officers will fly over backyards solely for the purpose of
observing activities within those yards, the Court's decision has im-
plications for all citizens attempting to conduct private activities in
their curtilage. 80 Police officers, at their own discretion, may now
observe private family life. Powell found it inconsistent to give the
police the power to conduct "warrantless surveillance at will" 8'
when the police are constitutionally forbidden to intrude at ground
level without a warrant. 82
III
ANALYSIS
A. The Critical Notion of "Open View"
The Court's decision in Ciraolo rested on the conclusion that
Ciraolo's backyard was in "open view"; it was in "open view" be-
cause members of the public could observe it from navigable air-
space.8 3 Apparently, Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
agreed that the backyard was in the curtilage, a traditional constitutionally protected
area. However, the Court concluded that even though the area was within the curtilage,
that fact alone did not bar all police observation. Id. at 1812 (majority opinion).
76 Although the majority opinion does not explain why it finds "open view" so sig-
nificant in determining Ciraolo's privacy expectations, the Court probably "believes that
citizens bear the risk that air travelers will observe activities occurring within backyards."
Id. at 1818 (Powell, J., dissenting).
77 Id. This notewriter, after conducting an investigation of what a "reasonable curi-
ous passenger" on a commercial airline could see from 1,000 feet, agrees with the dis-
senting opinion. Even at 1,000 feet (during take-off and landing) the most a passenger
can observe is a fleeting glimpse of a backyard. This notewriter finds it hard to believe
that an untrained, curious member of the public could distinguish marijuana plants from
any other greenery within the curtilage. See id. at 1818 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 1818 (Powell, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissenting opinion disagrees with
the majority opinion's application of Katz in Ciraolo. See supra notes 65-66 and accompa-
nying text.
79 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1818 (Powell, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 1819 n. 10. "It would appear that, after today, families can expect to be free
of official surveillance only when they retreat behind the walls of their homes." Id.
81 Id
82 Id. at 1818.
83 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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believed that "open view" was so obvious a matter of common sense
that it did not require analysis. Consequently, the Court failed to
acknowledge the difference between deliberate police surveillance
and the possibility of commercial aircraft flying over a backyard,8 4
and the difference between "open view" from ground level observa-
tion and "open view" created with the aid of technology. The
Court's concept of "open view" has an ominous ease and flexibility:
it can call into question a dweller's very ability to exhibit a subjective
expectation of privacy, or, just as easily, it can nullify the very possi-
bility of the reasonableness of such an exhibition. Thus, the major-
ity's conception of "open view" as an unswerving, naturally rational
doctrine allows the Court to sidestep the necessarily political deter-
mination of what society deems reasonable.
1. The Difference Between Ground-Level, Unenhanced "Open View"
and Aerial, Enhanced "Open View"
The Court's conception of "open view" is actually an enhanced
view created by technology. The Katz decision was the first case that
rejected the physical trespass notion of fourth amendment search.85
Katz was followed by the "unreasonable technology" cases.8 6 Be-
cause the police chartered a plane to fly over Ciraolo's home, they
created a view analogous to climbing stilts in order to look over a
fence (i.e., an enhanced view).8 7
Perhaps the view created by aerial surveillance is distinguish-
able from other unreasonably enhanced views. Such a distinction
would rest on the flight patterns of the area and the view of reason-
ably curious air passengers. For example, if Ciraolo's backyard were
in the direct flight pattern of many commercial planes, the enhanced
aerial view might be commonplace and, thus, not unreasonable.
Similarly, if all pedestrians in a certain neighborhood wore stilts,
stilt-climbing police officers would only enhance their view to an ex-
84 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1818 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Members of the public use
the air space for travel, business, or pleasure, not for the purpose of observing activities
taking place within residential yards."). More important, the fourth amendment pro-
tects the citizen from unreasonable searches by government and not from casual obser-
vations by a limited segment of the public. See People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 836
(1984), retransferredfor reconsideration in light of California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809
(1986), by 238 Cal. Rptr. 374, 738 P.2d 720 (1987).
85 See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
86 See supra note 45; see also Granberg, Is Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Constitutional?,
55 CAL. ST. BJ. 451, 451 (1980) ("aerial view is no more 'plain' than a wiretap is 'plain'
hearing").
87 Note, Curtains for the Curtilage?, supra note 30, at 747. See United States v. Kim,
415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976) (court excluded evidence gathered by use of tele-
scope to view illegal gambling in high rise building that police otherwise would have
been unable to obtain). See also cases cited supra note 45.
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pected level. 88 Thus, if an enhanced view is commonplace and ex-
pected, the dweller has sufficient notice that his yard is in "open
view" and his expectation of a private yard becomes unreasonable.
2. The Difference Between Deliberate Police Surveillance and the
Possibility of Commercial Aircraft Flying Over a Backyard
The Court did not acknowledge the difference between deliber-
ate police surveillance and the possibility of commercial aircraft fly-
ing over a backyard. The Court never distinguished possible public
observation by a curious air passenger89 from a police officer's de-
liberate search. The police practice in Ciraolo was a deliberate de-
parture from routine, ground-level surveillance. 90 To analogize
properly the deliberate police surveillance with the possible obser-
vations of passengers flying commercial aircraft, the Court needed
to determine the actual flight patterns of commercial aircraft in the
area. Instead, the Court assumed that airspace above a home is as
accessible as the street in front of a home and, therefore, anyone
may view the intimate life conducted in an unobstructed backyard.
The Court should have determined whether ordinary, curious
passersby on the "highway of the sky" could clearly view Ciraolo's
backyard; if not, the dweller's expectation of privacy from warrant-
less aerial surveillance was reasonable.9 1
3. The Effect of the Ciraolo Court's Unexamined "Open View"
Doctrine
The Ciraolo Court, in effect, endorsed a new definition of
''open view." Now open view is not only what is apparent to the
casual, curious passerby, 92 but also what the public hypothetically
might see if the public were particularly concerned with what is con-
tained within a private citizen's yard and had the power to arrange
88 See Note, supra note 12, at 391 (because dwellers do not ordinarily anticipate that
citizens carry telescopes and binoculars to observe dweller's private activities, dweller's
expectation of privacy regarding surveillance by such instruments should be
reasonable).
89 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
90 Courts have not clearly indicated whether the intent of the police in warrantless
aerial surveillance cases is relevant under the open view doctrine. See Note, Curtains for
the Curtilage?, supra note 30, at 744 n.112.
91 See Wright v. United States, 449 F.2d 1355, 1363-64 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 947 (1972) ("Fourth Amendment protects from invasion by the police the ac-
tions and conversations that the ordinary individual would reasonably expect to be
strictly private and free from perception by others, regardless of their locale."); see also,
Note, Curtains for the Curtilage?, supra note 30, at 747 (society finds reasonable the expec-
tation of privacy from an unreasonably curious passerby).
92 Note, Curtains for the Curtilage?, supra note 30, at 744 n.112 ("open view doctrine
... measures whether a person has exposed something to public view by determining
whether a reasonably curious passerby may observe it").
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and charter observational flyovers. By relying on a superficial ap-
plication of the "open view" doctrine, the Court obscures rather
than clarifies fourth amendment doctrine. Moreover, the Court's
conception of "open view" calls into question a dweller's ability
ever to exhibit a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in his
curtilage from aerial surveillance unless the dweller erects a view-
obstructing structure over his entire yard. Thus, the Ciraolo Court
leaves the Katz test devoid of meaning in the context of aerial
surveillance.
B. Departure from Katz
In his concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan found that objects
exposed to the plain view of outsiders are not protected because the
owner exhibited no intention to keep the objects private.93 In
Ciraolo, in contrast, the majority found that the backyard exposed to
"open view" was not protected even though Ciraolo exhibited an
intention to keep it private. Because Ciraolo did not exhibit an in-
tention to keep his backyard specifically excluded from aerial sur-
veillance his subjective expectation of privacy was unreasonable. 94
The Ciraolo majority determined that Ciraolo "[clearly-and
understandably ... met the test of manifesting his own subjective
intent and desire to maintain privacy." 95 In other words, he exhib-
ited an actual subjective expectation to keep his backyard private.
In fact, the State did not challenge that he had such an expecta-
tion.96 The Court, in dicta, however, created an extra dimension to
the first question in Katz;9 7 the Court questioned Ciraolo's "subjec-
tive expectation of privacy from all observations of his backyard"98
and found that Ciraolo lacked a subjective expectation of privacy
from aerial observation. 99 Ciraolo did not exhibit a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy from aerial surveillance because his backyard
was open to view from commercial planes. The Court determined
that his overall subjective expectation of privacy was unreasona-
ble.' 00 The "open view" doctrine is an important component of the
first question in Katz-whether the dweller exhibited an actual, sub-
jective expectation of privacy in his curtilage. The Court, in Ciraolo,
93 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
94 See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
95 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1811.
96 Id.
97 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
98 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812.
99 Ciraolo has no expectation of privacy from aerial observation because of the
Court's conception of the "open view" doctrine. See supra notes 65-66 and accompany-
ing text.
100 See Note, Curtains for the Curtilage?, supra note 30, at 742-43 nn.1 11-12.
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appears to use this doctrine in determining whether the dweller's
expectation of privacy was reasonable. Thus, a dweller who does
not knowingly expose his yard to open view but who, nevertheless,
leaves his yard open to the view of a "reasonably curious passerby"
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Court's dicta implies that Ciraolo had to take measures to
block the view of all aircraft from his backyard to satisfy its newly-
created test. 10 1 Thus, no private citizen who maintains an open-air
yard has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy; further, be-
cause an expectation of privacy that is not exhibited is per se unrea-
sonable, all subjective expectations of keeping a fenced-in yard
secluded from aerial surveillance are unreasonable. A yard com-
pletely enclosed, however, is no longer a yard in the ordinary sense
of the word; it ceases to function as an intimate outdoor enclave for
the use and enjoyment of the homeowner.
The Ciraolo Court left Katz devoid of meaning. The first ques-
tion in Katz was circumvented by the creation of a new prong to the
test: the exhibition of an expectation of privacy from all observa-
tions of a yard. The second question in Katz became an after-
thought; the Court avoided a full, reasoned analysis of what
expectations of privacy "society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.'"102 The second part of the Katz test, and the importance of
the fourth amendment in protecting citizens from unreasonable
searches, demands a more searching inquiry into the "personal and
societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment."' 10 3
C. Avoiding the Importance of the Curtilage
The Court's conception of "open view" freed it from the bur-
den of exploring the "personal and societal values protected by the
Fourth Amendment."' 1 4 In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,10 5 how-
ever, the Court noted that the curtilage surrounding a private home
is a place where society recognizes an individual's expectations of
101 The Florida Supreme Court does not read Ciraolo as "sanctioning an unlimited
right to any type of examination of residential property from the air." Riley v. State, 511
So. 2d 282, 286 (1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1988) (No. 87-
764). In Riley, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished a flyover by a fixed-wing plane
at 1,000 feet from a flyover by a helicopter at 400 feet. The Riley court found that
"surveillance by helicopter is particularly likely to unreasonably intrude upon private
activities." Id. at 287. Thus, the court held that the defendant had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in a greenhouse located within the curtilage from warrantless aerial
observations by a police officer flying in a helicopter at 400 feet. The U.S. Supreme
Court will presumably decide whether Riley is consistent with Ciraolo.
102 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
103 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984).
104 Id. at 182-83.
105 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
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privacy.10 6 Thus, on the same day it decided Ciraolo, the Court held
that protecting the privacy of curtilage is a relevant societal value.
The Court was remiss in not fully determining why in Ciraolo the
curtilage is not protected or at least given weight in a determination
of the dweller's reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court
should have weighed the level of protection usually afforded a
dweller in his curtilage against the unreasonableness of such protec-
tion when a "reasonably curious passerby on the 'highway' of the
sky" might observe the curtilage. 0 7
D. Public Policy Implications
Under the Court's view, the home and its curtilage are no
longer safe from police tactics designed to circumvent both the war-
rant requirement and reasonable attempts to maintain privacy in
one's yard. If the police cannot observe the curtilage from the
ground, they can observe it from the air even though they would
have needed a warrant to conduct a terrestrial 08 or electronic
search.10 9 The Court noted that the aerial surveillance in Ciraolo was
a "simple visual observation[ ] from a public place" and not a
search. 1 0 By holding that the police did not "search" the curtilage,
the Court avoided grappling with settled rights, such as the "right to
be left alone in the privacy of [one's] house."' 1 I Because the Court
held that aerial surveillance is not a "search," the police can observe
the curtilage of any citizen's home without violating the fourth
amendment. 1 2 Thus, the decision in Ciraolo grants new freedom
and flexibility to the police conducting aerial surveillance of private
homes; if police cannot observe a yard from the ground, they can
observe the yard from the air and gather information that private
citizens expect will remain private. The Constitution, and the cases
interpreting the Constitution, should " 'foreclose a regression into
an Orwellian society in which a citizen, in order to preserve a modi-
cum of privacy, would be compelled to encase himself in a light-
tight, air-proof box.' "113 Unfortunately, the implications of Califor-
106 Id. at 1825-27 (EPA's warrantless aerial surveillance of Dow's plant reasonable
because areas exposed to aerial observation analogous to open fields and not analogous
to curtilage).
107 Note, Curtains for the Curtilage?, supra note 30, at 747. See also supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
108 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
110 Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
111 Id. at 1819 (Powell, J., dissenting).
112 But cf United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) ("[w]arrantless searches
are presumptively unreasonable").
113 People v. Agee, 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 836 (1984) (quoting Lorenzana v. Superior
Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 636-37, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 593, 511 P.2d 33, 41 (1973)), retraus-
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nia v. Ciraolo portend just such a totalitarian future. "Don't go out
into the open. There might be someone watching."'"14
CONCLUSION
The Court ruled in Ciraolo that warrantless aerial surveillance of
the curtilage is not a fourth amendment search. The Court's deci-
sion elevates a doctrine of "open view" over the "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy" theory used by prior Supreme Courts in other
contexts and by the lower courts in warrantless aerial surveillance
cases. The Ciraolo Court applied the language of the Katz test with-
out searching into the reasonableness of Ciraolo's expectation
based upon the facts of this particular search. The Court did not
consider whether society was willing to protect an individual's pri-
vacy interests in his backyard. Thus, the Katz test became mere win-
dow dressing for a decision based on the majority's notion of
common sense.
The fourth amendment requires a searching inquiry into the
reasonableness of an individual's expectation of privacy. Courts
should scrupulously address the evidence concerning a specific
search and society's values about protecting a particular place
before deciding whether the search was reasonable. In the context
of aerial searches, however, the Ciraolo decision may make such de-
tailed, precise considerations obsolete.
Jane Becker
ferred for reconsideration in light of California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986), by 238 Cal.
Rptr. 374, 738 P.2d 720 (1987).
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